Apparently, wearing a skirt means you're a threat

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." ~ U.S. Constitution

When traveling on a plane, I specifically dress so as not to set off the metal detector. On my way back from a conference in Phoenix, I went through the detector and didn't set it off, as planned.

However, because I was wearing a skirt (and that was the ONLY reason, the TSA guard told me) he called for a pat down. A female agent came over and patted down my legs.

I presented no threat, no potential danger, did not set off the alarm and specifically wore nothing that would even remotely single me out for a pat-down. But apparently, wearing a skirt is some sort of indicator of potential terrorist activity and a pat-down was performed.

We have given up so much and it really hasn't made us any safer, though it has diminished our liberties and put us on a path to tyranny. As for the above quote, I don't care what they courts may say, the TSA violates this basic tenent every day!

Futility, thy name is 'security'

After a failed attempt to blow up an airplane on approach to Detroit Metro, the Department of Homeland Security decided to ramp up security measures at airports across the nation, telling travelers to arrive four hours ahead of time.

The problem is that increased screening of Americans isn't going to address the problem.

Every time the government sees a potential way to do harm to people on an airplane, they institute some new restriction or screening measure. Of course, people who really want to do harm will quickly find out about the new procedure/process and promptly begin to develop another method to get around it.

We're not allowed to bring more than three ounces of liquids on a plane. That didn't stop the idiot on Christmas Day from finding a way to get more than that amount on board - he just figured out a way around the screening.

The issue is not - and never has been - the materials. It's the behavior.

Anyone who has paid attention to security matters when traveling since 2001 will know that one-way tickets, paid with cash, and no luggage are huge warnings that should set off alarms all across the airport. Add to those tell-tale signs the fact that the man's father warned the U.S. about his son's radical ideas and you can see that the problem isn't the 'rules' but how the government failed to do anything with key facts that should have at least led to further questioning of an individual prior to getting on a plane, or having his name on a no-fly list.

Instead, we're all going to be subject to further intrusion in our lives, long delays in travel and the erosion of our liberties so the government can look like it's doing something to help keep us safe. Of course, no government can ever 'keep us safe' when they're more interested in little old ladies and how much shampoo they've got than in actually evaluating intelligence data that is pertinent to the safety issue.

Our government creates new laws or rules for travel and then goes about enforcing them. (The most recent ones are that you can't have a coat or blanket in your lap or go to the restroom one hour before landing.) That's a much different process than preventing terrorist attacks. Law enforcement focuses on catching a criminal after a crime has been committed. Stopping terrorism depends upon noticing, and then stopping, harmful intentions before they occur.

The travel security measures all look for the 'bomb' ... not the 'bomber.'

The Israelis have it right when it comes to screening for potential terrorists: they look for behavior, not supplies. They look for 'threats,' not 'risk.'

For instance, knives, scissors and other sharp objects are prohibited from carry-on luggage. If I happened to be traveling with said items, I would be a risk. But I'm not a threat. I have no intention of hurting myself or others or of committing an act of terrorism. So while those items would be 'safe' in my possession, they wouldn't be if in the possession of a terrorist.

Ah, but detecting who is and isn't a terrorist is much harder work than just forbidding everyone from carrying scissors on board a plane. And that's why terrorists will continue to find a way around the rules created to avert 'risk' and why we'll continue to have attempts from people who pose a 'threat.'

Our approach is futile. It won't stop terrorism, but does infringe upon everyone in the process. It reminds me of Benjamin Franklin's famous quote:

"They who would give up an essential liberty for temporary security, deserve neither liberty or security."

Screeners missed fake bombs, but can we learn from history?

According to this story in USA Today, security screeners failed to find fake bombs hidden on undercover agents.

"Security screeners at two of the nation's busiest airports failed to find fake bombs hidden on undercover agents posing as passengers in more than 60% of tests last year, according to a classified report obtained by USA TODAY.

Screeners at Los Angeles International Airport missed about 75% of simulated explosives and bomb parts that Transportation Security Administration testers hid under their clothes or in carry-on bags at checkpoints, the TSA report shows.

At Chicago O'Hare International Airport, screeners missed about 60% of hidden bomb materials that were packed in everyday carry-ons — including toiletry kits, briefcases and CD players. San Francisco International Airport screeners, who work for a private company instead of the TSA, missed about 20% of the bombs, the report shows. The TSA ran about 70 tests at Los Angeles, 75 at Chicago and 145 at San Francisco."

Interestingly, the private company only missed about 20% of the bombs while TSA agents at LAX missed about 75%.

Perhaps they're just more focused on whether or not we take off our shoes and ensuring that all those selected for 'individual screening' match the general demographics of the nation.

And then there was this statement further down in the article:

"The failure rates at Los Angeles and Chicago are "somewhat misleading" because they don't reflect screeners' improved ability to find bombs,..."

Super - so their failure rate is actually an improvement.

More and more, I think the Isrealis have the right idea about such security issues in that they screen for behavior rather than objects.

And then I came across this interesting column by Becky Akers from the Foundation for Economic Education in which she compares the bandits who robbed trains to the terrorists of today and the need to keep both forms of transportation safe for passengers.

"The railroads, like the airlines, might have turned to government for protection; they certainly never hesitated to demand the State’s help in acquiring land, financing their operations, or enforcing a cartel to squash competitors. But aside from the rewards some states posted and the lawmen they paid for capturing criminals “dead or alive,” the railroads assumed most of this responsibility themselves. That left them free to protect their passengers and equipment in ways prohibited to the airlines.

First, rather than relying on bureaucrats and hacks for security, the railroads hired the best companies available. Their agents concentrated on pursuing—literally—the culprits. They would have laughed at the idea that they should harass, search, and delay passengers at depots while waiting for the outlaws to come to them."

And she goes on to explain that, like so many 'solutions' today, it's easier to establish new bureaucracies with the appearance of solving the problem rather than take the more difficult steps to actually solve the problem.

"It’s far safer and easier to search law-abiding passengers than to track criminals, but it’s also useless: during the TSA’s four-and-a-half years of existence, not one of its employees has caught a terrorist. In lieu of bad guys, then, the TSA protects us from each other, from flyers who break the agency’s whimsical and ever-changing rules, from men named David Nelson (this name has unexplicably earned passengers close scrutiny) and Cat Stevens (aka Yusuf Islam), and from women wielding lipsticks. The list of mistakes and misdeeds that turn travelers into terrorists will continue to expand as the TSA tries to justify its existence and its $5 billion yearly budget—and as the government reaps revenue from the fines “terrorists” pay.

The railroads also confronted a real enemy. They neither lied nor exaggerated the risks because that would cost them customers. Contrast that with the bureaucrats at the TSA and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security. They depend on taxpayers’ fears of ubiquitous, magically lethal terrorists for their jobs and cushy offices. (The TSA’s headquarters boasts $500,000 worth of silk plants and artwork, a 4,200-square-foot fitness center, and seven kitchens.) So does their army of 45,000 airport screeners. Indeed, the government’s incentives are not only perverse but directly opposite the railroads’: the bigger the threat, the more government passengers “need” and the more eagerly they cede their freedom."

Akers doesn't believe that privatizing security is the cure-all. But she does suggest, and I agree, that "weaning the airlines from taxpayer-funded, politically driven “security”—and from the federal straitjacket accompanying it—would result in the same no-nonsense approach the railroads took. Jets worth billions guarantee the airlines’ scrupulous attention to providing their own foolproof protection. And repeat business comes only from living customers who reach their destinations in one piece."

I fear, however, that we've come too far down the road of dependence upon government for everything to every believe that a solution not government initiated would be a viable alternative.